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In early December, the U.S. President convened the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. His pledge was an end to decades of conflict in the volatile eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a sharply contrasting method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, targeting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President declared, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy exemplifies the defining principle of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a moving away from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on economic deals and ending wars—even as this squares with the new air campaign in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a senior U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative stated this, noting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This shift is major, but analysts note it is early to judge its results. The approach is influenced by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis predicts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Geopolitical Apathy and Tensions

Unlike his predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has broken out with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Relations and Selective Action

An analogous confrontation appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Observers describe the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the current policy likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.